While ostensibly aimed at the State of Missouri, Gen. John Frémont’s martial law proclamation electrified the nation. Here was an army general taking bold action relevant to the basic cause of the war. It especially caused a reaction in the White House, where President Abraham Lincoln was alarmed. After the time spent during Summer 1861 placating aggrieved Unionist slaveholders in the Border States, especially in strategic Maryland, which had lost slaves to Union army units camped in the state, Frémont’s proclamation threatened to sabotage all of Lincoln’s careful work (see the July 1o and August 14 editions of Civil War Emancipation). By ordering freedom for the slaves of disloyal owners in Missouri, Frémont called into question for Southern Unionists the Lincoln administration’s sincerity in asserting that it intended to respect the property rights of loyal slaveholders.
So Lincoln quickly penned a letter to Gen. Frémont which read:
MY DEAR SIR: Two points in your proclamation of August 30 give me some anxiety:
While concerned about Confederate retaliation with Union prisoners should Frémont execute rebel guerillas in Missouri, clearly Abraham Lincoln’s bigger concern was the general’s decision to free their slaves. Lincoln had only reluctantly signed the Confiscation Act in early August, which he feared would convince heretofore loyal slaveholders that the government intended to seize their people next. To Lincoln, the best response politically was quietly and quickly to get Frémont to retract the objectionable sections of his martial law proclamation. Unfortunately for Lincoln it would take more than a polite letter to get Frémont to back down.
One day, Abraham Lincoln would prove even more stubborn in defending his own proclamation of freedom for the slaves. But September 2, 1861, was not yet that day. The future Great Emancipator for what he believed were sound political and strategic reasons aimed at saving the Union was still defending the old order.
Source: http://www.simmonsgames.com/research/authors/USWarDept/ORA/OR-S2-V1-C4.html
This postadds some wonderful context to Lincoln’s letter to O.H. Browning on Sept 22 where he states, “I think to lose Kentucky is nearly the same as to lose the whole game. Kentucky gone, we can not hold Missouri, nor, as I think, Maryland.” Thanks for the post.
-Kurt
Hi Kurt. Great to hear from you. A wonderful quote I’ve read before. Most of Lincoln’s actions early in the Civil War, especially in regard to emancipation, need to be understood in the context of keeping the loyal Border States in the Union.
Don